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Abstract. This article analyzes the Wye Memorandum prescription to proscribe the Palestinian National 
Charter's (PNC) written provisions to destroy the Israeli state. The analysis is based on both 
deontological and consequentialist positions. (Embry-Riddle University student Lou Adesso III provided 
the creative impetus for this article.) 
 
One component of the Wye Memorandum is that the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) 
Executive Committee and the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm a letter from PLO Chairman Yasir 
Arafat to the United States President William Clinton concerning the nullification of the PNC's provisions 
that are inconsistent with still other letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel 
back in September 1993. In plain English, some formal representatives of the Palestinian people will 
further publicly repudiate a formal intention to seek the destruction of the Israeli state. Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his staff concurred with this component. So did Yasir Arafat and his 
staff? But is the component good for Israel? For the Palestinians? 
 
A Deontological (Intentional) Analysis. (1) Yasir Arafat and his allies intend to abide by an intent to no 
longer seek Israel's destruction and will act to effect this intent into a congruent consequence. (2) Yasir 
Arafat and his allies intend to abide by an intent to no longer seek Israel's destruction based on their 
own efforts, but do not intend to significantly change the intent or block the consequences of the intent 
of other Palestinian elements that intend the contrary. (3) Yasir Arafat and his allies do not intend to 
abide by an intent to no longer seek Israel's destruction. (4) Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies 
negotiated for Palestinian action on PNC provisions to improve the security of Israel. (5) Benjamin 
Netanyahu and his allies negotiated for Palestinian action on PNC provisions to hurt the security of the 
PLO, the Palestinian National Authority, and/or the Palestinian people. (6) Benjamin Netanyahu and his 
allies negotiated for Palestinian action on PNC provisions primarily to hurt the Hamas movement with 
secondary consequences for other entities. (7) Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies negotiated for 
Palestinian action on PNC provisions without any substantive, bilateral or multilateral intent but only to 
lengthen the negotiation process and/or for domestic political purposes. 
 
A Consequentialist Analysis. (1) The consequences of this component of the Wye Memorandum--if 
effected--will help and/or hurt the security needs of various political entities in the Mideast and of other 
participants in and observers of the Wye Plantation Summit. (2) The consequences of this component of 
the Wye Memorandum--if not effected--will help and/or hurt the security needs of various political 
entities in the Mideast and of other participants in and observers of the Wye Plantation Summit. 
 
The IBPP analysis is necessarily murky at this point because its options suggest that the main actors, 
other participants, and observers possess accurate conscious apperception of intent and will possess the 
same of consequence stemming from effecting or not effecting the Wye Memorandum. The IBPP 
analysis also ignores that--even through the best of intentions--public professions of peace may 
inevitably exacerbate the threat of violence. In addition, the analysis ignores that observations that 
seem accurate over time--for example that one or both sides are continuing to repromise promises that 
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have been broken--may mask a change that would render these observations seemingly inaccurate if 
that change were noted and not discounted. 
 
The bottom line? Even if President Clinton addresses a gathering of Palestinian representatives (also 
stipulated in the Wye Memorandum) to validate public Palestinian repudiation of intent to destroy 
Israel, intentions and consequences cannot be reliably grasped. Given that public policy is predicated on 
an attempt to define and structure a rational basis for action or nonaction--and given that rationalism as 
a mode of approaching degrees of certainty has many epistemological vulnerabilities as does faith and 
empiricism among other vehicles of knowing--effecting reaffirmation of nullification may be moot. Yet 
decisions still must be made--actively or passively. The chilling scenario of decision-making in such a 
context supports existentialist notions of dread and despair as the authentic essence of life--dread and 
despair more profound than any reactive to death through political terrorism. (See Benjamin, R.D. 
(1998). Negotiation and evil: The sources of religious and moral resistance to the settlement of conflicts. 
Mediation Quarterly, 15, 245-266; Heidegger, M. (1997). Being and time: A translation of Sein and Zeit. 
(J. Stambaugh, (Ed.).) State University of New York Press; Spector, B.I. (1998). Deciding to negotiate with 
villains. Negotiation Journal, 14, 43-59; Text of the Wye Memorandum. (October 24, 1998). 
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/102498mideast/agree-text.html; Vorauer, J.D., Claude, 
S-D. (1998). Perceived versus actual transparency of goals in negotiation. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 24, 371-385; Watkins, M., & Lundberg, K. (1998). Getting to the table in Oslo: 
Driving forces and channel factors. Negotiation Journal, 14, 115-137.) (Keywords: Israel, Palestinian, 
Public Policy, Wye Memorandum, Wye Plantation Summit.) 
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